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"SUBJECT TO FINANCING" CLAUSES
IN INTERIM CONTRACTS
FOR SALE OF REALTY
RAY

J. AIYEN**

I. COMPONENTS OF THE PROBLEM

A. Practical Considerations
Certainly there is nothing either new or particularly worrisome in
the fact that a high per centage of real estate purchasers, especially
over the last decade, and especially in residential transactions, have
found it necessary to finance a substantial part of their purchases. What
is both new and worrisome, from a legal standpoint, is that this vital
provision of the interim contract has ordinarily received such cursory
attention from the parties, their brokers, and, occasionally, their lawyers as well. Seldom, if ever, does the clause relating to the purchaser's financing requirements spell out more than a short suggestion
of the various considerations involved in modern mortgage financing.
Indeed, it is as common to see the simple phrase, "subject to financing", inserted randomly in the contract as it is to find any more definitive provision.
However ineptly the matter is phrased, however, its practical significance is inescapable: unless the intending purchaser can somehow
raise a per centage of his purchase price on loan, using the property as
security, the purchase and sale envisioned by the contract cannot conceivably be performed. In probably a majority of cases, only the scantiest investigation of the borrowing power of the purchaser has been
conducted at the time of interim contract. With somewhat lesser frequency, but still quite commonly, there has been no current appraisal
to determine the approximate security-value of the property. Andperhaps most universally of all-a vague set of unfounded preconcep*Based upon an address by the author before the Midwinter Meeting, State
Bar of Wisconsin, Real Property, Trust & Probate Section, Feb. 20, 1959.
**Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. This paper was prepared with the research assistance of Robert Slattery, of the Law Review
Staff.
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tions is the best available indication of the repayment capabilities of the
prospective borrower.
What is, in consequence, very commonly unrealized by the parties
(if not by the brokers) is that "financing" is a term of broad scope,
involving a multitude of complexities. There are, for example, the
following minimum considerations:
1. What amount is sought to be borrowed?'
2. What repayment rate, extending over how long a period of time,
is contemplated ?2
3. What interest rate, and what initial "service" or "discount"
charges will be acceptable ?3
1 Specifying

the amount in the statement of contingency may afford inadequate
protection. In Day v. Kerley, 146 A. 2d 571 (Muni. Ct. D.C. 1958), the contract called for a $13,000 G.I. mortgage, apparently to be arranged for by
broker, with seller paying the prevailing discount and service charges. On
broker's testmony that buyer had orally authorized him to obtain a $12,000
loan, buyer was estopped, as against seller, from pleading the condition. Much
the same result was produced in Probst v. Di Giovanni, 232 La. 811, 95 So.
2d 321 (1957), where a contract condition of $35,000 financing at 6% over not
to exceed 10 years was held waived by purchaser's letter stating that a $32,000,
15-year commitment was acceptable. The case arose, however, because seller
sought to plead the condition in defense of broker's action for commission.
In Zigman v. McMackin, 177 N.Y.S. 2d 723 (1958), a seller's contention that
purchaser was obligated to accept offered financing in any amount reasonably
close to the stipulated "not more than $10,000" was rejected. Louisiana
strictly enforced the stated loan amount in Savich v. Ruiz, 32 So. 2d 415 (La.
App. 1947). The contract was subject to a $4,000 loan, and the lender to
which application was made refused to approve over $3,800. Seller offered to
post additional security to bring the loan up to the contract amount. Purchaser held entitled to refuse, and to recover down payment. Much the same
type of situation was similarly handled in Antonini v. Thrifty-Nifty Homes,
76 So. 2d 564 (La. App. 1955), and in Slack v. Munson, 61 So. 2d 618 (La.
App. 1952).
No case discovered involves an attempted judicial construction of a "subject to financing" clause, lacking any statement of amount of mortgage intended, as to that particular feature.
2 Reese v. Walker, 151 N.E. 2d 605 (Munic. Ct. Cincinnati, Ohio 1948), where
the contract was "Contingent on securing necessary financing." Purchaser
rejected a $10,800, 6.6% 12 year loan, offered in response to his application
for a 6% 15-year loan. "The clause would mean to a layman: 'If we can
borrow the money we need to finance the purchase on terms we can repay...'
Financing in its ordinary meaning connotes more than simply the face amount
of a loan. It includes thhe interest rate, the term, the rate of repayment, and
other terms and conditions. It means a loan on terms that the borrower can
repay. Under the contract as executed, only the buyers can determine what
financing they need. Having signed the contract without specifying what
financing was 'necessary financing', the seller is in no position to complain
if the buyers state they need a loan with repayments at a certain rate. .. "
3 Doerflinger Realty Co. v. Maserang, 311 S.W. 2d 123 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958)
was a suit by brokers directly against purchasers, who had countermanded payment on their earnest money check. The purchase offer was
"subject to their ability to procure a cash loan . . . as per application for
same now on file with Doerflinger Realty Co." The application in question
specified a 5%, 20-year, $20,000 loan; but agents of the broker emphatically
insisted, in their conversations with purchasers, that 5% money was unavailable. There were evidences that purchaser's mother-in-law did not approve
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4. Is the contemplated loan to be "conventional", or are FHA or
VA loan guarantee benefits to be sought ?5. What special security-protection provisions (tax and insurance
reserves, mortage life insurance, mortage repayment insurance, ordinary or special accelleration provisions, etc.) are acceptable, and are
they to be deemed part of the specified repayment rate?5
6. By whose effort is such loan to be arranged and procured; if by
the purchaser's (with or without the broker's assistance), what potential sources of the money shall be applied to,6 and within what span of
time?7
of the property, and purchaser himself cited his health as his excuse for
withdrawal. Nevertheless, the court held the broker's oral statements that
5% money was unavailable to constitute an effective rejection of purchaser's
application, defeating the condition precedent of the main contract, despite the
fact that a commitment satisfying the application was obtained well in advance of the contract closing date. "Nothing in the sale contract required
them to seek a loan elsewhere or under different terms or under a different
application."
4 Schwartz v. Baker, 99 N.E. 2d 498 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950) is a somewhat
enigmatic decision on an equally enigmatic clause: "$6,900 cash, Bal. of $11,000
thro (sic) FHA, this offer is subject to $10,000 loan." The trial court received
extrinsic evidence to the effect that purchasers intended to include non-FHA
financing, since FH-A guaranties were known to be unavailable on the transaction. On this proof, and the evidence that purchaser made no attempt to
procure non-FHA financing, vendor was permitted to enforce the liquidation
of damages against the earnest money deposit.
Equally obscure is Johnson v. Graham, 35 So. 2d 278 (La. App. 1948),
where a contract "subject to my ability to secure a loan on the above described
property in the amount of $7,100" was alleged, in the pleadings, to have been
intended to stipulate the prevailing terms for FHA loans. In any event, the
purchaser applied for FHA loan guaranty, and the property was approved
for only $6,000. Purchaser then suggested, by letter, that vendor accept a
second mortgage for $1,100; and vendor responded with an offer to loan the
entire $7,100 on FHA terms. At this point, purchaser withdrew, and broker
returned his deposit. The trial court dismissed the vendor's action against
the broker on the theory that the contract contemplated third-party financing,
not vendor-financing. The appellate court reversed, commenting that "The
proviso . . . did not name any specific loan agency." It -would probably have
been more to the point to state that the proviso did not require that the loan
pass FHA appraisal; and that, even had it done so, the purchaser's letter
could constitute a waiver. The issue of substitution of vendor for third-party
financing, however, is reserved for discussion below.
5 Aside from the purely practical consideration that such special security devices add materially to the cost of the loan, and may render it prohibitive,
Fry v. George Elkins Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 256, 327 P. 2d 905 (1958) held that a
purchaser was not entitled to reject offered financing simply because he objected to a 2% prepayment penalty clause, where his contract was "conditioned upon buyer obtaining $20,000 loan at 5% for 20 years." Buyer evidently
decided, after entering into the contract, to migrate to Hawaii. Noting this
fact, and the fact that "It is a matter of common knowledge that the lending
policies of different classes of financial institutions vary greatly", a trial court
finding that buyer's application to two banks (ignoring the broker's suggestion
that a savings and loan would consider the application) did not constitute
good faith, was affirmed. Presumably, the only safe course is expressly to
exclude special security devices in the statement of the condition.
6 Kelley v. Potomac Development Corp., 81 A. 2d 81 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C.
1951), involved the failure to explicate, on a printed form of contract, which
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party was to procure the financing. "(T)he purchaser is to assume, give,
place, take title subject to, a first deed of trust secured on the premises ...
"
Decision: "We think the evidence permitted the trial court to conclude that
the loan was to be obtained by the (purchaser)."
See also Fry v. George Elkins Co., note 5, supra. Hannah v. Yanke, (unreported, Cir. Ct., Milwaukee County, Wis., 1957) ruled similarly on a case
where purchaser applied to a savings and loan, was rejected on the ground
that the property was insufficient security, and then withdrew. "This one
effort to secure a loan does not sustain the (trial) court's conclusion that a
bona fide effort was made to secure a loan." Suspect though they may be,
the decisions demonstrate the hazard involved in failure to explicate the
extent of search which will satisfy the contract. Huckleberry v. Wilson, 284
S.W. 2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), involved a contract contingent upon procurement of a G.I. loan. Purchaser duly applied, certifying his intention to
occupy the premises as a home; but, prior to any action on the application,
purchased other premises, informing vendor that his property was unsatisfactory. On learning of this, the prospective lender cancelled the application.
Trial court entered directed verdict for purchaser, in action to recover earnest
money. Reversed. Issue for jury.
Considerable confusion appeared in the early Louisiana cases respecting
the necessity of designating the sources of loan to which application should
be made. In Titus v. Cunningham, 164 La. 431, 114 So. 86 (1927), the trial
court held the condition "subject to homestead loan" potestative (i.e., imposing
no mutality of obligation), although Morrison v. Mioton, 163 La. 1065, 113
So. 456 (1927) had ruled that "subject to homestead loan to be granted by
Orleans Homestead Assn." imposed an "inescapable duty" on purchaser to
apply to that association for a loan, and was not potestative for that reason.
No review of the trial court determination of the question in Titus was
sought, but the appellate opinion seems to imply that the ruling was incorrect.
Nevertheless, Mathews Bros. v. Schoenberger, 11 La. App. 155, 123 So. 133
(1928) holds that a contract providing "Terms $6,000. cash, bal. thru homestead" is potestative, on the ground that it fails to designate whether buyer
or seller shall undertake to procure the loan, citing Titus. Decker v. Renaudin, 10 La. App. 725, 122 So. 600 (1929) compounded the confusion by attempting to distinguish Morrison on the ground that there a particular lender
was named in the contract. By the time of Weingart v. Delgado, 204 La.
752, 16 So. 2d 254 (1943), the confusion had apparently been resolved. The
contract there named no specific lender, but carefully provided the terms of
proposed loan "which loan the purchaser obligates himself to obtain if procurable." In McPherson v. Warren, 55 So. 2d 30, (La. App. 1951) the contract simply provided, "subject to loan." Purchaser applied to one bank,
one building and loan association, and was refused by both. The court left
at rest the overloaded question whether the contract was potestative, ruled
it to be subject to a suspensive condition which had not occurred, and held
that plaintiff had made diligent effort to comply. The common law equivalent
of the civil law's "potestative" contract is the aleatory, or illusory, contract.
The common law equivalent of the civil law "suspensive" condition is the
condition precedent.
Callahan v. Siebert, 95 N.J.L. 243, 113 Atl. 914 (1920) construed the condition rather literally in purchaser's favor. "A further condition of this agreement being that the vendee is to negotiate either the reinstatement of the loan
of $5,000 in full in his own name from the present Building and Loan Ass'n...
or to negotiate from some other association a mortgage of said amount under
like conditions..." Purchaser applied to the existing mortgage-holder for reinstatement, which was approved only on condition that purchaser undertake
to expend $200 in repainting the building. He refused, but made no effort
to procure financing elsewhere. On suit to recover down payment, the court
ruled the provisions of the contract to be alternative, and held the purchaser
not required to accept the obligation of repainting, nor to seek elsewhere
for acceptable financing. It may have been significant that time was declared
to be of the essence of the agreement, and only three days remained during
which purchaser might have attempted to procure other financing. The decision does not specially comment on the point.
Doerflinger Realty Co. v. Maserang, supra, note 3, is the only case discovered in which a purchaser whose application to a named lender was refused was expressly relieved of any obligation to apply elsewhere. Kovarik
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7. If a lender should indicate a willingness to make a mortgage loan,
assuming that the interim contract specifies no minimum acceptable
terms, may the purchaser refuse the offered loan on the ground that its
terms are onerous, without violating the agreement (i.e., must the terms
be "satisfactory to purchaser," "reasonably satisfactory to purchaser"
or merely "reasonable") ?s
v. Veseley, discussed at length in the text below, held that the named lending
institution was not "of the essence," but did not affirmatively suggest a duty
on purchaser to make further inquiry. Such duty, however, appears to be
implicit in the decision, since the case suggests that the conditon could be
satisfied at any time prior to the stated closing date. In this respect, is Sorota
v. Baskin, 334 Mass. 123, 134 N.E. 2d 428 (1956) distinguishable? The contract
was there contingent upon sellers' ability to procure extensions of existing
mortgages. Seller made one unsuccessful attempt to do so, and returned the
deposit. "We hold that the defendants were not required as a matter of law
to do any more than they did, and particularly they were under no duty to
endeavor to procure the extensions up to the date of performance of the
agreement."
Margolis v. Tarutz, 265 Mass. 540, 164 N.E. 451 (1929) and Meyer v.
Custom Manor Homes, Inc., 167 N.Y.S. 2d 112, App. Div. 2d 488 (1957) both
demonstrate that a contract obligating the seller to procure the financing, but
not specifying the extent of his required diligence, may involve seller in the
same sort of difficulty. In both cases, seller assumed, erroneously as it developed, that the worst consequence of his lack of diligence would be return
of the down payment.
7 The express time-allotment for procurement of financing has been enforced
strictly, even in the absence of any provision declaring it "of the essence."
Masson v. Vella, 94 So. 2d 454 (La. App. 1957) involved a loan approval
issued one day after expiration of the 60-day procurement period. "Since
the loan was unavailable during the contract period, this contract then became null and void." In Hodorowicz v. Szulc, 16 Ill. App. 2d 317, 147 N.E.
2d 887 (1958), the contract was conditional upon purchasers selling their
house, and sellers were given an option to cancel if it was unsold by March
5, 1955. The sale was not effected until May, and purchasers repudiated the
contract. Reasoning that the contract was initially unenforceable because
of the precedent condition, and that sellers had an option of withdrawal after
March 5, the court held that the contract lacked mutuality after March 5, and
that "there was never a mutually binding and enforceable contract and agreement in effect between the parties."
The time-of-procurement limitation is one aspect of the condition which
appears to be for the benefit of both parties. Woodlark Const. Corp. v. Callahan, 89 N.Y.S. 2d 67, 275 App. Div. 857 (1949) ; Kenney v. Wedderin, 220 La.
285, 56 So. 2d 550 (1951) ; Baker v. Fell, 135 Tex. 375, 144 S.W. 2d (1940).
But the financing contingency itself is for purchaser's benefit only, and may
be waived by him within the time limitation. Nyder v. Champlin, 401 Ill. 317,
8 81 N.E. 2d 923 (1948) ; Morrison v. Mioton, supra,note 6.
In Antonini v. Thrifty Nifty Homes, supra, note 1, the contract specified
merely "ability of purchaser to borrow... $6250 by mortgage loans or loan."
A homestead Association refused to loan over $4,000, but vendor offered to
loan the difference at 8% for 11/2 years. "We do not think plaintiff was
obligated to accept... A fair interpretation of the contract ...

would be that

the contract would be enforceable provided purchaser could secure the $6250
loan on the usual and customary terms and conditions, to be repaid over a
period of years, such as loans made by any homestead, the FHA, or other
long term lending institution." Lach v. Cahill, 138 Conn. 418, 85 A. 2d 481
(1951), construed "mortgage in the sum of $12,000" as meaning "suitable
mortgage." Cf. Reese v. Walker, supra, note 2, which upheld the buyer's
right to reject a variance of .6%, in interest rate, and 3 years in repayment
period, without discussing whether such mortgage was "usual and customary"
or not. The test there was stated to be buyers' determination in good faith
"what kind of a loan they need," largely determined by "terms that the
borrower can repay." The last-mentioned aspect arose in a different context
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8. What is the consequence of a prospective lender's withdrawal,
after tentative commitment, from his agreement to loan, assuming that
neither party to the interim contract foments such withdrawal ?9
To answer any of these important questions on the basis of an
interim contract which merely recites that the transaction is "subject
to financing" is to undertake an herculean feat of construction. Whenever it occurs, however, that one of the parties seeks to enforce the
contract, and the other takes refuge in the indefinite financing "contingency", the only alternative to judicial construction of the clause is to
declare the unenforceability of the sale, frequently in the face of an
agreement that is in all other respects unmistakable in its provisions.
in Real Estate Management, Inc. v. Giles, 293 S.W. 2d 596 (Ct. App. Tenn.
1956), where a contract was "contingent upon buyer's being able to purchase" two tracts of land owned by third persons. The trial court held that
buyer's failure to purchase the other tracts was due to his failure to offer
a price for them which was both within his means and "within the bounds
of reason," and therefore enforced the contract in favor of seller. In reversing, the court asked, rhetorically, "Did Freeman, a successful businessman, by using the words 'able to purchase,' have reference to his financial
ability? Did he intend to unconditionally obligate himself to purchase the
...tracts at prices he might consider excessive . . . Or . . .is it not reason-

ably apparent that (he) had reference to his being able to acquire the tracts
at prices acceptable to him? The latter appears to be .. .the more logical
and reasonable construction." Kovarik v. Vesely, discussed in the text infra,
describes the right to select the terms of financing as being "left to the discretion of the buyers." Cf. Callahan v. Siebert, supra, note 6, where buyers
were held justified in rejecting a loan because coupled with a $200 repainting
requirement; and Fry v. George Elkins Co., supra, note 5, where buyers were
held not entitled to reject a loan because coupled with a 2% prepayment
penalty clause.
The impact of this problem upon the question of the bona fides of the
purchaser in seeking financing is inescapable, and becomes the touchstone of
the entire legal problem arising out of these clauses.
9In re King's Estate, 183 Pa. Super. 190, 130 A. 2d 245 (1957) presented such
a problem, but failed to resolve it because the plaintiff purchaser failed to
plead or argue the point on either trial or appeal. The contract condition
was "subject to the securing of a mortgage in the amount of $5,500." A loan
association approved an application conformably to the contract, but cancelled
the application upon notification that Mr. King had died. At the attempted
"closing," seller offered to take Mrs. King's note and mortgage. She sought
return of the down payment on the theory that the contract was fatally indefinite, in that it specified no mortgage terms, and was unsuccessful. "It
seems to us that the appellant would have been on more substantial grounds
had she .. .directed her action at the recovery of the deposit on the basis
of her inability to obtain financing... "
A comparable, and more provoking circumstance arose in Brandes v.
Oram Constr. Corp., 158 N.Y.S. 2d 897 (1956). Purchaser had made application
for a GI loan. While the same was pending, he withdrew it, stating that he
had learned that he would require an operation, that his financial circumstances had taken a turn for the worse, and that he anticipated that his
future income would be less than that stated in the application and insufficient
to permit him to carry the loan. Seller challenged the action as a breach of
the agreement. Held, for buyer. "He acted wisely and prudently in withdrawing the application." Cf. Fry v. George Elkins Co., supra, note 5, where
buyer decided that he would probably move to Hawaii; and Kelley v. Potomac
Development Corp., supra, note 6, where buyer's marriage plans apparently
went awry. Suppose buyer simply performs a reanalysis of his future budgetary aspects, and informs lender that his original estimates had been overoptimistic? Is the buyer's assumption of his continued good health the only
aspect of the matter which he may correct without penalty?
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Cases may arise under such clauses, it is true, which are entirely
too plain for argument. On the one hand, the "subject to financing"
clause may spell out with uncommon attention to detail the particular
financing requirements envisioned by the parties, specifically declare
each element thereof as being "of the essence," and positively state
that, unless each such element is satisfied, the agreement shall be null
and void. Any litigable question arising under such a clause would
necessarily be either a straight question of fact, or would arise under
some aspect of the law of waiver or estoppel. On the other hand, regardless of the indefiniteness of the clause itself, it could occur that,
after diligent inquiry, the purchaser would find it impossible to obtain
any amount of financing from anyone on any terms whatever. In such
cases, the only legal problem which can arise with respect to the clause
is whether it should be construed to express a contingency at all, or
whether it was simply inserted for some incidental purpose, not affecting the primary obligations to buy and sell.10
10 Inexpert draftsmanship of the clause occasionally suggests the applicability
of Williston's rule: ".... if ... (the parties) ... intend that the debt shall be

absolute, and fix upon the future event as a convenient time for payment
merely.., then the debt will not be contingent; and, if the future event does
not happen as contemplated, the law will require payment to be made within
a reasonable time." 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, (Rev. ed.) §799, p. 2246. The
rule was applied in Noord v. Downs, 51 Wash. 2d 611, 320 P. 2d 632 (1958),
in permitting seller to collect on a demand note taken in lieu of earnest money,
which expressed itself to be payable "on approval of loan to mortgagor by
Lincoln Fed. Sav. for purlchase of home etc." There appeared to be ample
evidence in the case, however, from which the same result might have been
reached on a theory of purchaser's waiver of the condition. The appellate
court indulges in unabashed fact-finding when it says ".

.

. the reference to

the approval was meant to fix a convenient time for repayment and not to
embody a condition limiting the liability of the defendants." It is difficult
to perceive, except in cases involving waiver of the condition by purchaser,
how a reference to uncertain purchase-money financing could be intended as
anything but a conditioning of the obligation. Prima facie, at least, that
would seem to be the reasonable connotation of the reference. Zucht v.
Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 207 S.W. 2d 414 (Ct. Civ. App., Tex. 1947) is
a thoroughly anomalous decision on the point, unsatisfactory mainly because
the contract itself is not set out. Purchasers "contend that the contract .. .
was based upon a condition, to wit: the ability . . .to borrow $5,500 on the
property . . .at the interest rate of 5%. The so-called 'Earnest Receipt' does
contain language that such loan was contemplated, but there is nothing in the
receipt to indicate that such matter was made a condition precedent to the
effectiveness of the contract." To the same effect is Pegg v. Olson, 31 Wyo.
96, 223 Pac. 223 (1924), where the contract provided that the balance of price,
after down payment, was to be paid "as soon as C. S. Olson . . . can get a
loan through from the government . . ." Substantially identical language re-

lating to sale of purchaser's property, however, was held to express a condition precedent in Biggs v. Bernard, 98 Ohio App. 451, 130 N.E. 2d 152 (1954).
Declaring that "The essential thing is for the court to look at the contract
from the standpoint of the parties at the time they executed it, and the purpose they had in view in doing so," the Kentucky court, in Hawkins & Chamberlain v. Mathews, 242 Ky. 732, 47 S.W. 2d 547 (1932) ruled conditional
a contract providing terms of payment "as follows: At least $1,500 plus an
amount of not less than $6,000 obtained on loan in a building and loan association secured by a first mortgage, to be paid in cash; balance evidenced by
notes bearing interest at 6% per annum . . . " Buyers' down payment was

returned when the $6,000 mortgage could not be obtained. The closest ap-

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

These plain cases, however, are by no means usual. It may be wondered, therefore, why only a comparatively few cases involving the
construction and effect of such clauses have reached our appellate
courts." The answer is largely a practical one. From the seller's standpoint, his primary aim is ordinarily to convert his property into cash as
quickly as possible. Any attempt to enforce the contract, as by declaring the down payment forfeit under the liquidated damage clause, or
by suing for damages or for specific performance, would necessarily
thwart that primary objective over a protracted period of time. Furthermore, the "demurrage" which may be expected to accumulate over
the period of litigation (taxes, insurance, upkeep, lost rents, heating,
etc.) is frequently so substantial as to over-shadow completely a small
down payment. While such elements of sellers' damages may be recoverable in a proper form of action, the difficulties of collection of
such a judgment are usually obvious.
From the buyer's standpoint in any but the plain cases, the trouble
and expense of litigation, especially up to the appellate level, will ordinarily not be justified by a nominal amount of "earnest money," which
is all the buyer can hope to recover. In close cases, faced with the distinct possibility of sending good money after bad, the buyer will most
often be inclined to negotiate rather than to litigate a solution of the
dispute.
The ultimate practical decision, however, is most often that of the
broker. By the prevailing rule, his commission is earned when the
interim contract is executed, regardless of whether the transaction is
ever consummated."2 Whether or not the same rule obtains where the
interim contract is itself subject to a contingency is a point that has not
proach to a Wisconsin determination of the question is George v. Oswald,
273 Wis. 380, 78 N.W. 2d 763 (1956). The contract there provided "$1,000
tendered herewith, and $6,000 more in cash on day of closing of sale, and the
balance of $10,000 to be paid on the day of closing of the sale of the buyers
home . . ., which should take place in about ninety days." Apparently, the
court treated the sale of the buyer's home as a method of fixing time of payment of the balance, rather than as a condition; but the case was complicated
by several rather unusual circumstances, one of which was the fact that the
closing date of the first sale was fixed very definitely in advance of the contemplated consummation of the second. Whether or not the same interpretation would have been placed on the agreement, absent this circumstance, is
questionable, e.g. "$1,000 tendered herewith, and the balance when sale of
buyer's home is closed."
"For reasons only partially explicable by the practice of reporting intermediate
appellate cases, Louisiana appears to be the only jurisdiction in which "subject
to financing" cases have arisen with any degree of commonness. The reader
of this article will note the comparatively paucity of cases from courts of
final appeal.
12 Wauwatosa Realty Co. v. Paar, 274 Wis. 7, 79 N.W. 2d 125 (1956) and numerous authorities there cited. See note to the case at 41 Marq. L. Rev. 202, however, suggesting that, under the terms of a common form of novation, broker
is limited to half the forfeited earnest money where the transaction fails
to close due to purchaser-default. The provision was present, but was not
argued, in the cited case.
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yet been clearly determined (though better reason would clearly suggest the negative) ;13 but, if the contingency can be successfully argued
to have occurred, it seems clear that the commission has been earned.
By the usual form of contract, the expenses and commission of the
broker are given first claim against the earnest money deposit in the
event of forfeiture.14 The result is that any litigation respecting the
proper construction of the "subject to financing" clause will boil down,
practically, to a quarrel between broker and buyer.
But practical considerations will ordinarily dissuade the broker
from litigating such a question. In the first place, his client, the seller,
will be inclined to take a dim view of such proceedings, because they
involve the same practical handicaps to the seller's interests as were
discussed above. In the second place, the broker is in no position to
litigate the issue directly against the buyer. His claim for commission
against the down payment is assertable only against the seller, 15 who
must, in turn, litigate the question against the buyer. Both of these
circumstances will ordinarily be deemed to reflect so seriously upon the
broker's business reputation as to deter him from recommending litigation, or from claiming commission, if his listing contract remains in
force.
The result is that the construction, of the "subject to financing"
clause is most frequently determined by negotiation rather than by
litigation. So long as the real property market continues to enjoy
brisk activity, it may be expected that a claimed buyer-default, arising
from inability to finance or from different causes, will not be uniformly
enforced by litigation. The alternative of prompt and equivalent resale is entirely too promising.
But this comparative infrequency of litigation is little solace to the
lawyer or judge who must deal with such a case. For his assistance,
this paper will explore the various legal and practical complexities involved in the construction and operation of "subject to financing"
13 A number of cases seem fairly in point: Biggs v. Bernard, 98 Ohio App. 451,

130 N.E. 2d 152 (1954); Probst v. Di Giovanni, 232 La. 811, 95 So. 2d 321
(1957); Shaper v. Gilkison, 217 S.W. 2d 878 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). It is
apparent that neither buyer nor seller are obligated to pay commission on a
conditional contract (assuming the condition to be precedent or "suspensive")
if the condition does not occur, and that seller is so obligated if the condition
does occur, but buyer nevertheless fails to "dose" the transaction. But if
buyer, by inaction, defaults his implied obligation to seek financing, can broker
have any recourse against seller, except as specially provided with respect
to defaulted earnest money? Presumably not. And, in such event, what is
the theory of broker's case against buyer for lost commissions? Would
Mitler v. Associated Contractors, 4 Wis. 2d 568, 91 N.W. 2d 367 (1958) suggest
a possible basis?
14 Or provides for division of it between broker and seller, as pointed out in
the note at 41 Marq. L. Rev. 202, cited supra, note 12.
15 See slight elaboration of the point at note 13, supra.
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clauses, with primary emphasis upon the Wisconsin law applicable to
the subject.
B. Legal Considerations
The legal problems presented by contracts of this type fall into
three categories:
(1) Arguments concerned with the issue whether the clause is susceptible of construction at all;
(2) Problems of evidence, procedure, and "rules of construction";
(3) Problems of appropriate remedy.
In the first category, the specific questions most obvious for consideration are:
(1) Does such a contract, assuming some degree of failure to
explicate the details of the financing contingency, satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds?
(2) Regardless of the foregoing inquiry, is the contract sufficiently
definite and certain to be enforceable, simply as a contract?
In the second category, such main questions arise as:
(1) To what degree are express statements of the details of financing "material" to the contingency?
(2) Which party-vendor or purchaser-has the burden of proof
respecting fulfillment or nonfulfillment of the contingency?
(3) What varieties of evidence are competent on the question of the
parties' intention in using the ambiguous language of contingency, and
of what may judicial notice be taken?
In the third category, the following problems must be faced:
(1) To what extent is the liquidation of damages, customarily provided, enforceable, and by what means?
(2) Are equitable remedies, especially the decree of specific performance, available?
It is true, of course, that many of these questions raise legal problems of far broader scope and application than are immediately involved in the "subject to financing" clause. The same problems arise
under an infinite variety of contracts, and their answers are strongly
analogous if not identical in principle. But it is thought proper to
include such considerations in this paper nevertheless, because the
questions are of a sort which, though very commonly encountered, are
seldom answered with any degree of definitive explanation. Further,
they are questions which, while certainly not unique to the subject
types of contract, arise almost universally in cases dealing with such
contracts.
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II.

PROBLEMS OF THE FIRST CATEGORY:

ARE SUCH CONTRACTS SUSCEPTIBLE OF CONSTRUCTION?

A. The Statute of Frauds
A remark which can stand as a worthy candidate for the understatement of the year is that American jurisdictions are not uniform,
either inter sese or intra sese, in their views respecting the statutes of
frauds.'6 In face of such confusion of thought, it is perhaps imprudent to venture a generalization of any kind on the subject. But, for
purposes of economy of presentation, the writer will nevertheless do so.
The statutes of frauds generally have been held to require that a contract for the sale of realty must be reduced to writing, at least to the
extent of stating in such writing the "material elements" or "essential
terms" of such contract.
The inevitable problem with such a rule, of course, is that there is
little or no agreement on what are the "material elements" of a contract for purchase and sale of real estate. Quite obviously, the identification of buyer and seller, of the property, and of the price are materialY.1 But, commencing with the terms of payment or of credit,"'
and proceeding thence through the various title-assurance provisions,
the provisions for transfer of possession, 9 and the special agreements
respecting the rights on default, the contract involves a considerable
number of points which are of less obvious materiality. Somewhere in
this doubtful zone lies the "subject to financing" provision.
Let the issue be clear. If the "subject to financing" provision is a
"material element" of the parties' agreement, the statute requires it to
be expressed in writing; and a mere statement that the sale is "subject
to financing"-without considerably greater detail-could no more
satisfy the statute than could, for example, a statement that the sale
was "for a price." The analogy just drawn, however, is not entirely
free of objection as to its validity. Viewed in proper context, the two
situations are dissimilar in one respect: the determination of the price
Annot. 23 A.L.R. 2d 164; 49 A.L.R. 1464.
v. Burhans, 91 Wis. 348, 64 N.W. 1031, (1895); Kelly v. Sullivan,
252 Wis. 52, 30 N.W. 2d 209 (1947).
18 Schmeling v. Kriesel, 45 Wis. 325 (1878) ; Buck v. Pond, 126 Wis. 382, 105
N.W. 909 (1905); Carlock v. Johnson, 165 Wis. 49, 160 N.W. 1053 (1917);
Merten v. Koester, 199 Wis. 79, 225 N.W. 750 (1929); Kenner v. Edwards
R. & F. Co., 204 Wis. 575, 236 N.W. 597 (1931) ; Kovarik v. Vesely, note 27,
infra. Cf. Swedish-American Nat'l. Bank v. Merz, 174 N.Y.S. 600 (1914).
', May v. Lathers, 257 Wis. 191, 43 N.W. 2d 15 (1950); Kelley v. Ellis, 272
Wis. 333, 75 N.W. 2d 569 (1956). Can the language of these two cases be
reconciled? Can May be reconciled with Long Inv. Co. v. O'Donnel, 3 Wis.
2d 291, 88 N.W. 2d 674 (1958): The agreement in May contained the phrase
"possession March 1, 1948." The court ruled, "It was an essential part of the
agreement that (purchaser) was to have possession of the premises on that
date." In Long the agreement provided that buyer was to pay the balance
of purchase price "not later than July 1, 1953." He having failed to do so
by July 13, 1956, seller resold the lands, and buyer sued for breach of con-

16

'7Harney
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is a matter which concerns the undertakings of both parties to the contract, whereas the determination of the term "financing" is one which
qualifies only the buyer's undertaking to pay the price-not the seller's
undertaking to accept it as full payment.
The failure to appreciate this distinction has led often to the citation of cases out of point on the statute of frauds question here under
discussion. It is frequently held that, where the parties have agreed
that some part of the price may "stand upon" the land, the seller undertaking to supply credit to the buyer, the contract will violate the statute
unless the details of such agreement are expressed in the writing. 0
To cite these cases, however, to a contract which envisions third-party
financing, is to ignore a critical point. Where the vendor supplies
financing himself, he is necessarily and directly interested in the terms
of repayment, and such terms are even as necessarily part of his contract of sale. But where it is contemplated that a third person shall
supply the credit, the vendor is utterly unconcerned with the terms of
such credit.2 1 His right is to receive cash regardless.
Simply because the credit-sale cases above distinguished do not
control the issue, however, is not sufficient to conclude that a "subjectto-financing" contract ipso facto satisfies the statute of frauds. It
appears entirely competent to argue the ultimate question along either
of two lines, productive (unfortunately) of opposite conclusions.
On the one hand, it can be reasonably argued that such a writing
(assuming the omission of detail) fails to express a material element
of the contract in that it fails to state with any degree of definiteness a
condition which qualifies the purchaser's basic undertaking to buy.
True, the condition is a collateral one; but equally-collateral conditions
have been ruled indispensable in some cases. For example, a failure to
express in the written interim contract the "release prices" under a
proposed mortgage (i.e., the amounts for which the purchaser, giving
a mortgage back to the seller for part of the purchase money, might
procure release of selected parcels of the mortgaged lands without
satisfying the entire mortgage debt) has been held to violate the statute
of frauds.

22

On the other hand, it can be argued that the agreement of the parties simply did not include any mutual agreement respecting the
details of financing, and that the interim contract, involving the identical omissions, was therefore a complete statement in writing of the
agreement itself-which is all the statute requires. To the somewhat
tract! Time was declared not to be "of the essence." Perhaps "essential" and
"of the essence" are not equivalent terms.
20 Notes 16 and 18, supra.
21
22

Except to the extent of the time-of-procurement limitation, as pointed out
at note 7, supra.
Carlock v. Johnson, cited supra, note 18.

1959-1960]

INTERIM CONTRACTS

separate argument that an incomplete contract reduced to an equivalently incomplete writing is unenforceable on two counts, the reply is
that the details of the prospective third-party financing are not matters
of contract as between buyer and seller; and their omission cannot,
therefore, be said to constitute an incompleteness either of contract or
of the writing.
The contract litigated in Kenner v.Edwards R. & F. Co.,23 presents
an interesting basis of analysis on the question. Buyer there agreed to
buy subject to financing in a stated amount, to be borrowed against the
property from a stated third-party lender, pursuant to loan negotiations
in progress at time of contract. The details of the proposed financing,
if they were in fact determined at the time, were unstated in the contract. The unusual feature of the transaction, as compared with the
common "subject to financing" provision, was that the credit arrangements were to be made and concluded entirely by the seller, with the
buyer thereafter taking the property subject to the resulting encumbrance, assuming the repayment obligation.
The members of the court were unanimous in holding the contract
enforceable, as against a contention that the financing provision violated the statute of frauds; but the grounds for such decision were widely
at variance as between the majority and justice Owen, concurring.
The majority opinion is difficult to understand, seeming as it does to
suggest that the terms of financing were not an essential part of the
sale agreement itself, but that those terms were "accessible" in the
negotiations under way, and that they were incorporated into the contract by reference. Since it nowhere appears that the matters so incorporated by reference existed, at the time, in any written form, it is
difficult to conceive how the statute of frauds could be satisfied by
reference to negotiations which themselves lay in parol.
The concurring opinion, however, treated the question with greater
simplicity and directness. "In effect," said justice Owen, "the plaintiffs constituted the defendant their agent to negotiate this mortgage,
without any limitation as to the rate of interest it should bear or the
length of time it should run. This might or might not have constituted
good business conduct, but it is not perceived why a person sui juris
may not make such a contract and may not repose such confidence in
another with whom he is doing business." And later, "I believe this
to be a definite and enforceable agreement, but, whether it is or not, I
am certain it is not void under the statute of frauds.

24

The translation of this principle into other cases, even into such
closely similar cases as the common "subject to financing" clause presents, is not a process free of difficulty. The difficulty stems from the
23 Cited supra, note 18.
24 204 Wis. 575, 589.
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problem of fixing a limitation upon the principle itself. If agencies
will be implied out of a failure to state any terms of contemplated
financing, with the agent's power limited only by the details expressed,
why would not a statement of price as "between $30,000 and $40,000"
confer a like authority to use discretion, simply as between the parties.
There would be no difficulty in authorizing an independent agent to
buy in that fashion, but such an agent would be bound by the obligations of fidelity and account to his principal. 25 The same can scarcely
be said of one who dons the mantle of agent in negotiating an aspect
of a contract to which he is personally an opposite party.
Perhaps a better way of expressing the principle, therefore, would
be to cast it in terms of option. The party in whom is rested the
power to determine the unstated details of the financing could be said
to have an option to fix those details to suit his preference.2 6 So construed, there would seem to be no necessity of any written statement of
such details, either in the interim contract, or in any document incorporated into it by reference or by legal artifact, or in any subsequentlyexecuted form of writing, unless there be some corrollary rule to the
statute of frauds which would require that such power of determination be exercised in writing.
The final qualification, questioning whether or not such an option
must be exercised by a writing conforming to the statute of frauds, has
caused no little confusion and difficulty, especially in the decision of
Kovarik v. Vesely. 7 That decision proceeded upon the complete assumption that, while the terms of the mortgage financing were "left to
the discretion of the buyers" under the typical "subject to financing"
provision, the statute of frauds would be satisfied only if the exercise
of that discretion, by selecting definite terms, were not only written but
"subscribed" by the "party to be charged." Nowhere in the decision is
it suggested why either is necessary, though it is readily apparent, from
the heavy reliance which the decision places upon Crabtree v. Elizabeth
Arden Sales Corp.,28 that considerable confusion clouded the mind of
the court. The Crabtree case dealt with a contract which, by its terms,
was not to be performed within one year; and applied a statute2 9 which
required a memorandum of such contract to be "signed by the party
to be charged." The Wisconsin statute of frauds relating to contracts
for sale of real estate3" requires the memorandum to be "subscribed by
the party by whom the... sale is to be made or by his lawfully author25 2 Am. Jur., Agency, §252, 253, pp. 203-4.

Reese v. Walker, supra, note 2, so suggests, as does Kovarik v. Vesely, note
27, infra.
273 Wis. 2d 573, 89 N.W. 2d 279 (1958).
2s305 N.Y. 48, 110 N.E. 2d 551 (1953).
290 N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law §31; the Wisconsin equivalent is §241.02 (1957).
3 §240.08 (1957).
26
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ized agent," and has been repeatedly construed as not requiring the
signature of the purchaser at all."
To speculate upon what rule underlaid the Kovarik decision is dangerous, but perhaps not unwarranted. It may have been the unspoken
keynote of the case that, unless either the interim contract itself or some
document legally a part of it states the terms of proposed financing,
the contract fails under the statute of frauds. This would be equivalent
to holding that such terms of financing are a material and essential part
of the interim contract itself, which cannot be ordinarily omitted from
the writing under the "option" theory, unless the option is itself exercised in writing. A second rationale of the case would be that the court
did not deem it necessary to decide the indispensability of the financing terms to the writing, because the decision here finds the written
statement of such terms to have existed. Yet a third speculative possibility is that the entire opinion on the question is sheer obiter, and that
no written statement of the terms of proposed third-party financing is
necessary under the statute of frauds, using the reasoning of either the
majority or concurring opinions of Kenner v. Edwards as support for
the conclusion.
None of the suggested hypotheses is free of very profound difficulty, even if regarded without the additional problems which Kovarik
v. Vesely offered. The difficulty with the first hypothesis is that no
reason or authority appears in support of the supposition that such
discretion must be exercised in writing.3 2 It is difficult to see how the
exercise of a purchaser's discretion to select terms of financing acceptable to himself can constitute either a conveyance or a contract to convey real estate; and it is even more difficult to imagine how, practically,
such exercise could sensibly require the signature of the seller or buyer
for its efficacy. Of course, simply by citing the Crabtree decision, the
court seems to dispense with the latter problem; but that process
plainly ignores differences in the statutory language.
The difficulty with the second and third hypotheses is that they
find not a whisper of support in the language of the opinion itself,
other than the simple citation of the Kenner case.
So the entire question remains disturbingly unsettled. It would
seem that the clause ought properly to be treated as creating an option
(or "discretion") to select terms, and that such option need not be
exercised in writing. So interpreted, there would seem to be no serious
doubt that the statute of frauds is satisfied by the common interim contract containing a "subject to financing" clause; although, with Justice
Wis. 563, 163 N.W. 173 (1917) ; Russell
v. Ives, 172 Wis. 123, 178 N.W. 300 (1920).
32 Russell v. Ives, supra, note 31, is direct authority to the contrary. It appears
to state the general rule.
31Heins v. Thompson & Flieth L. Co., 165
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Owen, we may have grave misgivings respecting the business prudence
of the party granting such an option.
This conclusion, so far expressed, suggests that a writing is not
necessary either to define the terms of or to constitute an effective
exercise of the option. It does not suggest, at this point, the propriety
of holding that the mere act of applyipg for a loan on given terms constitutes a binding exercise thereof. This aspect of the problem shall
receive later consideration.
B. Indefiniteness and Uncertainty
"An agreement in order to be binding must be sufficiently definite
to enable a court to give it an exact meaning. ' 33 How does a promise
to buy a certain piece of real estate, for a certain cash price, but "subject to financing", fit within this elementary rule?
We are not here speaking of the statute of frauds. We are ignoring what the parties wrote and signed, and speaking simply of what
they in fact agreed to. Has their agreement an "exact meaning" or
hasn't it ?
Ignore the "subject to financing" clause and the question answers
itself. But is it proper to ignore the clause, even if the entire contract
must fail of enforceability if it is not ignored? Courts are often prone
to dismiss problems of this sort simply by labeling the issue "collateral" or "nonessential." From an early day, equity has so regarded the
"time of performance" provisions of certain contracts,34 and with some
justification. The doctrine of "substantial performance" has excused
violations of this covenant and that, and again with some justification.
Whenever it is possible, by implication, construction, or other device, to supply a deficiency of the agreement with a reasonable degree
of certitude, the courts will do so, rather than let the entire contract
fall. 35
The essence, therefore, of the question here under discussion is not
whether an agreement to buy "subject to financing" is indefinite, nor
whether such indefiniteness is "substantial, material, or essential," but
rather whether in the ordinary case an attempted judicial interpretation
of the clause, supplying the missing detail, can achieve the requisite
degree of certitude.
If the above-suggested option theory be adopted and applied, much
of the problem of indefiniteness dissolves. If the right to determine the
acceptable terms of financing be regarded as being utterly without limitation, then the definiteness of the extreme applies. But to label the
CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) §37, p. 98; 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS,
§32.
34 Though hardly with any degree of consistency, as evidence note 19, supra.
35 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, (rev. ed., 1936), §37, p. 100; Inglis v. Fohey, 136
Wis. 28, 116 N.W. 857 (1908); Taylor v. Bricker, 262 Wis. 377, 55 N.W. 2d
404 (1952) ; Kelley v. Ellis, supra, note 19; George v. Oswald, supra, note 10.
33 WILLISTON,
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privilege an unlimited one comes dangerously close to the line of illusory or aleatory contract, because the party holding the right to select
terms has it within his power to name impossible ones, escaping his
own primary obligation thereby. 3G
The alternatives to this unsatisfactory principle are basically two:
(1) By close investigation of the detailed circumstances of the
buyer, and of his statements and conduct throughout the transaction,
limits of greater or lesser precision might be placed upon the amount
and terms of financing which he presumably intended;
(2) Current practices in the community with respect to the financing of similar purchases might be resorted to.
Neither course is realistic, at least as applied to the ordinary case,
because both ignore the essentially personal character of mortgage
financing. The question is not, and cannot be, whether or not a 5%
interest rate, on 15-year equalized payments, is "reasonable." Of course
it is reasonable, simply as a general proposition. Nor is it the question
whether or not the buyer could, or thought he could, "afford" to make
such payments.3 7 If he could afford them, it would only mean that he
could not afford something else. To say that he has already committed
himself to buy the particular property which is the subject of the contract, and has therefore made his choice, is to beg the question.
The basic quarrel with these forms of inference as applied to the
buyer's financing requirements is that they declare a specific state of
mind-a willingness to undertake a given repayment program-which
in fact did not exist. The buyer's thinking on the matter is, with very
rare exceptions, entirely tentative.38 To translate such tentative and
piecemeal thoughts into an integrated set of acceptable financing terms
is to create by judicial fiat what the broker was unable or unwilling to
create by sales persuasion.
Something of this process was present in Kovarik v. Vesely. 39
36

The decision of Reese v. Walker, supra, note 2, is disarmingly vague in adding,
almost as an afterthought, "Of course, buyers must show good faith . . .
They must honestly determine what kind of a loan they need and must make
a bona fide effort to obtain it." Is it any less honest of borrowers to determine that they need the now-extinct 4% loans than it is of lenders to determine that they need the now-current 6%% rates, with escalators, "service"
points, and prepayment penalties superadded? Did Congress act in bad faith
when it recently refused to authorize an increased interest rate on Government long-term borrowing, though loans at the old rates were largely unprocurable?
3 See Real Estate Managament, Inc. v. Giles, supra, note 8.
3
8 There is a frank recognition of this fact in Savich v. Ruiz, 32 So. 2d 415, (La.
App. 1947), cited supra, at note 1: "It seems to us that when a purchaser
agrees to buy property under the conditions as contained in the agreement

here, he does so for two reasons (1) to learn what appraisement would be

placed on the property by the appraisers to re assure himself as to his bargain, and (2) so that he can secure sufficient finances to consummate the
purchase..."
39 Note 27, supra.
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After declaring that the buyers there had a "discretion" to select acceptable terms of financing, the court declared, "However, when they
signed the (mortgage loan) application to the Fort Atkinson Savings
and Loan Association, and such application set forth the terms of the
loan applied for, they had exercised such discretion and were bound
thereby."
Some further explication of the facts of the Kovarik contract is
now necessary. The contract was expressly "contingent upon buyer's
ability to arrange . . . a $7,000 purchase money mortgage from the

Fort Atkinson Savings & Loan Ass'n." An application was made to said
association, allegedly upon a form blank as to terms, but into which the
Association's then-current interest rate, duration of loan, and tax reserve provisions were subsequently inserted. The Association formally
denied the application, 40 but the seller verbally offered to finance the
buyer's purchase on the same terms. 41 The buyer rejected the latter
offer, sued to recover his down payment, and was counterclaimed
against for specific performance. Judgment for seller on his counterclaim was affirmed. Because "Kovarik's testimony stated no reason
of any kind with respect to why the Kovariks preferred having the
mortgage loan come from the Association rather than from the Veselys," the court held that the provision of the contract respecting source
of financing was nonessential. With this last aspect of the ruling,
dissenting Justice Fairchild took emphatic exception.
But what of the central problem? There can be no question but
that buyer's initial decision to purchase was essentially tentative, expressly contingent as it was upon their ability to finance. In the practical realm, "ability to finance" is not simply a present ability to meet a
the ground that the property afforded insufficient security, under the
association's appraisal.
This offer was not made until purchaser's demand for return of his very
substantial down payment had been refused and both parties had placed
the matter in the hands of attorneys. Both Antonini v. Thrifty-Nifty Homes
and Savich v. Ruiz, supra, note 1, involved the same basic technique: that of
vendor offering belatedly to supply, in one fashion or another, the financing
which purchaser could not obtain from third parties. In Antonini, the court
said, "The conclusion is inescapable that neither of the parties at the time
of confecting the agreement entertained any idea whatsoever of carrying out
the financing of the sale wholly or partly between seller and purchaser."
Strangely, the case cites in support of the statement both Savich v. Ruiz,
which seems to embrace the same principle, and Johnson v. Graham, supra,
note 4, which enforced an offer of vendor-financing (under circumstances,
however, strongly suggestive of waiver). It is entirely possible that Johnson
was mistakenly cited to the trial court's finding: "The securing of a loan on
property from a third person is not the same as the seller carrying the unpaid balance of price as a mortgage on the property." Lach v. Cahill, supra, note
8, is distinguishable on the ground that there vendor offered the unsuccessful

40On
41

loan applicant a purchase money mortgage payable on demand, or alterna-

tively, vendor-procured third party financing on unspecified terms. Ruling
that purchaser "required a mortgage payable in reasonable amounts over a
period of time," and without directly passing upon the question whether
vendor-financing could satisfy the contingency, the court ordered the earnest
money returned.
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stated monthly repayment schedule, or an isolated willingness to pay a
stated rate of interest. 42 It involves an extremely hazardous business
judgment, on the part of both borrower and lender, no small factor of
which is the security value of the property involved.4"
In this aspect, the significance of the loan application as an exercise
of the buyers' discretion pales decidedly. The applicant does not declare
that the loan is a feasible one. He simply inquires whether it is or not.
The inquiry is, like the purchase agreement which prompts it, entirely
tentative.
If the court's declaration be correct that the making of the application constituted a total decision to finance on those terms, it is to be
wondered why the formal application was necessary at all. Why could
not the officer of the Association who allegedly inserted the terms simply have testified to what terms he would have inserted had the buyers
made application-to the lender's current terms, in other words? And
if the business judgment of the Association that the loan was not a
sound one, in which the buyers concurred, was to be disregarded as of
no significance, then the "subject to financing" contingency bestows no
greater discretion on a buyer-or even on a designated third-party
lender-than can be supported with a recitation of reasons. Presumably, no "reason" is acceptable which tends to derogate from the general obligation to complete the purchase under the contract; and this
would include the lender's basic judgment that the transaction was unsound from the overall point of view.
The upshot of the matter is that either the option of the buyer to
determine the availability of sound financing must be interpreted as a
broad one, both initially and subsequently, or else judicial judgment
will have to be substituted for that of the buyer. 44 The sole remaining
alternative is to permit the contract itself to fall for uncertainty. Of
the three possible courses of action, the first one seems more appropriate, and to represent the prevailing view outside of Wisconsin.
III.

PROBLEMS OF THE SECOND CATEGORY: WHAT RULES OF EVIDENCE,
PROCEDURE, AND CONSTRUCTION ARE APPLICABLE?

A. The "iMateriality" of FinancingDetails
A problem which will often be encountered will involve the judicial
42 Reese v. Walker, quoted to that effect at note 2, supra.
43 Savich v. Ruiz, note 38, supra.
44 What is worse, the judgment of the appellate tribunal is occasionally substituted for that of the trier of fact. The determination whether or not good
faith is exercised by a prospective purchaser seems appropriately a question
of fact under conflicting possibilities of inference. Huckleberry v. Wilson and
Hannah v. Yanke, supra, note 6, appear to stand at opposite poles on the
issue. Kovarik v. Vesely must, logically, represent the proposition that good
faith requires a purchaser to ignore a designated lender's determination that
the property has insufficient security value to support a loan. In the pur-
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attempt to rationalize away express provisions of the "subject to financing" contingency on the ground that they were not "material" to the
contingency itself. The prime illustration arose in Kovarik v. Vesely,' 5
where the court ruled that the source of intended financing named in
the contract was not intended to control. The ruling was based, apparently, upon the inability of the buyer to explain, in his testimony, any
reason why he considered the matter important ;4' and was analogized
to similar rulings on "time of performance" provisions in contracts
generally. It was the opinion of Justice Fairchild, dissenting, that the
ability or inability of the buyer to justify the provision by recitation of
reasons was immaterial; and that, viewed objectively, there are many
reasons why borrowing from a given lending institution might be
materially preferable to borrowing from a seller.4"
The question here intended for analysis, however, is considerably
broader in scope than the single matter of sources of financing. The
draftsman of a "subject to financing" clause who seeks to avoid, as far
chaser's own judgment, such determination may have been a vital "term" of
the loan on which the contract was conditioned.
45 Note 27, supra.
46 "Kovarik's testimony stated no reason of any kind with respect to why the
Kovariks preferred having the mortgage loan come from the association
rather than from the Veselys ... The trial court could reasonably infer from
the absence of any such testimony ...that the words of the contingency clause
... were intended to have reference to the ability of the buyers to finance the
balance of the purchase price by means of a mortgage loan of $7,000 on
terms of their own choice, and that the source of such financing was not
a material part of the condition." Ibid., p. 583. The impact of the parole
evidence rule on the problem is not discussed. Presumably, however, there
underlies the foregoing statement a judicial presupposition that "$7,000 purchase money mortgage from the Fort Atkinson Savings & Loan Ass'n" is
an ambiguous provision of the contract, with respect to the source of the
intended financing, because it fails to include the word, "only." Otherwise,
the consideration of the extrinsic circumstances (especially those which did
not arise until weeks after the Contract) would seem inappropriate. Would
the same reasoning be applied tb a stipulation of the amount of loan, the
interest rate, the duration, etc., if the word, "only" were similarly omitted?
47 "Examples of such reasons are: That the buyer will feel more confident of
his own judgment of the price he is to pay if a lending institution is willing
to make a loan; that the buyer would rather have the matter, in the event
of default, in the hands of an established lending institution than in the
hands of an individual who might be less able, if not less willing, to adjust
matters reasonably." Ibid., p. 585. Consider the radically different bases
upon which institutional financing and vendor financing are approved. An
institutional lender must decline to loan, even under banking regulations, if
the security value of the property is, in its judgment, inadequate; and such
lender will also make an objective appraisal of the financial position of the
applicant, refusing to loan if it appears probable that he will find himself
in financial distress. To decline the loan costs the institutional lender nothing.
But a vendor gives little or no attention to either of these factors. He finances
the sale only because he wishes thereby to protect the strong benefit of bargain which he contingently achieved under the basic contract. Protected by
his down payment, he has everything to gain and nothing to lose by offering
the financing. Refusing it, he loses the sale. Why else do department stores,
appliance dealers, auto dealers, and the rest offer "easy credit" which no
institutional lender could or would duplicate? Mr. Kovarikls inability to
deliver a professional dissertation on these distinctions apparently cost him
dearly.
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as possible, the indefiniteness of the usual provision may spell out precise specifications respecting the financing which will satisfy the contingency. In so doing he must walk a tightwire of speculation between
the demands of the immediate parties' satisfaction and those of prospective lenders; and it is quite likely that offered financing will vary
somewhat in terms from the contract specifications. The question will
then arise: Is the variance sufficiently substantial or material to prevent
fulfillment of the contingency?
The varieties of nonconformity between contract and offered financing which might be imagined are innumerable. The interest rate
or service charge might be fractionally higher than the contract provision permits, special reserves might be required which are unprovided for in the contract, special provisions for acceleration or for
prepayment penalty might be demanded, FHA approval might be
conditional upon the making of certain repairs or renovations on the
property, maintenance of mortgage life insurance might be insisted
upon, "closing costs" might exceed the contract amount, repayment
periods or interest-computation periods might vary from the contract
specification, the loan-principal offered might be somewhat less than
the contract specifies, etc. etc.4s
Insistence by the buyer upon the letter of the contingency in all
such cases will be a safe course only if he can successfully meet the
following challenges:
(1) That the variance is "immaterial" or "nonessential."4
(2) That the buyer was able to obtain financing which strictly
complied with the contract specifications but rested his efforts to that
end prematurely. 50
48 The cases cited at notes 1-5, supra, illustrate litigation over a number of

these variances.
-19 Kovarik v. Vesely, supra, is the only case appearing to rest its approbation
of a variance on this ground. It analogizes the problem to that of determining the essentiality of "time of performance" provisions, as dealt with in
Long Investment Co. v. O'Donnel, cited supra, note 19: But is the stipulation
of the terms of a condition precedent truly analogous? Modern law maywell presume against unintended forfeiture of vested contract rights by overstrict application of the "law day" concept. But where is the parallelism
when, because of failure of a condition precedent, no primary contract rights.
have come into existence? In short, are the "equity of redemption" and
"substantial performance" doctrines properly applicable to conditions precedent ?
50 This is the final point considered in Kovarik v. Vesely, at p. 584, which seems.
to establish a conformity between the performance date of the sale contract
itself and the fulfillment date of the financing condition. ".

.

. the buyers

had no right to rescind the contract prior to the closing date because of inability to secure the $7,000 mortgage loan." It is questionable whether the
buyers asserted any right to rescind the contract; their argument was that,.
after exercise of reasonable diligence on their part, the condition had not
occurred, and that, therefore, the prime contract never was enforceable, according to its own terms. What the court may have intended was a rule that,
where a contract is subject to a condition precedent but silent as to the time
at which occurrence or non-occurence will be determined, the performance
date of the contract is presumed to be the ultimate intended time. But does
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(3) That the buyer, by his words or conduct, waived the variance,
or estopped himself from showing it. 1
The circumstances which will tend to arise in the average transaction will quite frequently provide a plausible foundation upon which
seller may base one or more of these challenges. Consider, for example, that the buyer will ordinarily make application to a given lending
institution in much the same general way that Mr. Vesely did in
Kovarik v. Vesely. The institution will consider the application as
conforming (if by its terms it does not literally conform expressly or
by reference) to its established current mortgage-loan policies. Should
these policies include terms or conditions which do not meet the specifications of the interim contract, the fact of the buyer's application
might easily be taken, as it was taken in the Kovarik decision, to bind
the buyer to those terms or conditions, superceding the contract to that
not this confuse the "precedent" aspect of the condition? Ordinarily, in
practice, when the parties expressly fix such ultimate time for procurement
of financing,* it is set vell in advance of closing; indeed, the parties are
anxious to discover, as promptly as possible, whether or not they have a sale.
The court seems to meld the condition into the contract itself, as if it were
a thing promised in the same sense that the contractual performances are
promised, and at the same time. The true inquiry, in such case, should be
whether the purchaser's attempt to procure financing was so unreasonably
foreshortened as to impugn his good faith, under all the circumstances. Perhaps Kovarik's effort was prematurely rested in this sense; but, since neither
trial nor appellate decisions correctly conceive the issue, no finding on the
point was made. See Couch v. Stewart, 200 S.W. 2d 642, (Tex. Civ. App.
1947) for an illuminating analysis of the question: "Such an instrument ...
could not become operative as a contract of purchase until the occurrence
of the expressly stated condition precedent thereto . . . (The proper inquiry
is) whether, by the exercise of reasonable diligence the (buyer) could have
arranged a ...
51

loan ...

within a reasonable length of time." See also Sorota

v. Baskin, supra, note 6.
Waiver of the condition, either in whole or in a particular aspect, has sometimes been described by that term (e.g. Probst v. Di Giovanni, supra, note 1)
and sometimes, under strongly similar circumstances, as estoppel (e.g. Day v.
Kerley, supra, note 1). The estoppel theory seems also to apply in another
sense, however, since nonperformance of the implied undertaking to make
a good faith effort to procure financing seems to operate fundamentally as an
estoppel. The principle is variously stated. "A party to a contract may not
insist upon a condition precedent where he himself has caused or brought
about its nonperformance." Meyer v. Custom Manor Homes, 167 N.Y.S. 2d
112, 4 App. Div. 2d 288 (1957). "Where two parties enter into a contract and
the consummation of said contract is dependent upon occurrence of a future
event, the promissor should do nothing to prevent the occurrence of such
future event." Huckleberry v. Wilson, supra, note 6. The same rule is cited,
somewhat out of point, in George v. Oswald, supra, note 10: "It is a rule of
law that one who by mutual contract confers on another a right, or imposes
a duty impliedly agrees not to defeat that right or to make impossible the
performance of that duty by any affirmative act of his own." See also Morrison v. Mioton, supra, note 6; and quotation from Reese v. Walker, supra,
note 36. Regardless of the repeated emphasis in the statements of rule upon
"affirmative acts," the "inescapable duty" concept announced in Morrison
seems to require, universally, that the party by whom the financing was intended to be sought should not sit idly by and, by inaction, suffer it not to
be procured. However, it is doubtful whether or not the bland assumptions
of the court in George v. Oswald that, but for the inaction, the contingency
of time would have occurred according to its terms, are either valid or
necessary. This point is explored under the next heading of the text.
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extent. 52 Any of the three theories above enumerated might be invoked to justify the rule.
To cite another illustration: If dissatisfied with the offered financing, the buyer will most frequently advise the seller or broker of the
fact, and declare either that the contract is at an end so far as he is
concerned (demanding his down payment), or that "unless we can do
something about this" he will be unable to perform. A conversation
ensues, in which buyer is urged to "be reasonable" and to "state what
will satisfy" him. Responsively, if not cooperatively, the buyer declares a set of financing specifications which, though at some variance
with the available plan, is also at variance with the contract details. His
53
ill-considered statements return to haunt him in the ensuing litigation.
Again, the buyer may object to proposed closing costs which are
higher than the maximum prescribed by the contract, though the offered financing in other respects corresponds. Informing the seller of
this, and of buyer's intention to utilize the contingency to escape from
the deal, the buyer is met by a suggestion that seller and broker will
"make up" all or a part of the difference by crediting the price, or in
some other fashion. If buyer refuses, he is in danger of running into
the same sort of reasoning as controlled the Kovarik case: What difference should this make to a buyer, so long as it isn't costing him any
In this connection, the problem of oral modification of a contract required
to be in writing does not necessarily arise. The financing contingency itself
being ordinarily for the benefit of purchaser only (see note 1, supra, no
modification of the contract, in its bilateral aspect, is involved in a waiver.
None of the cases appear to have considered the problem of adequacy of
formalities to effect waiver of an express term, in the particular area. Kovarik
v. Vesely actually involved an attempted oral modification, by the substitution of vendor-credit for the contractual provision, cash at closing. The
unaccepted oral proposal so to modify was enforced by specific performance
at the behest of the seller without discussion of the modification issue, although it was urged in the briefs. Under the authorities, the issue is difficult
to overlook, RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS, §223, declares, "For the determination of the question whether a contract to vary a prior contract is within
the statute, the second contract is regarded as creating a single new contract consisting of so many of the terms of the prior contract as the parties
have not agreed to change, and in addition to the new terms on which they
have agreed." By this process, the contract enforced in Kovarik is squarely
within the prohibition of the cases cited at footnote 18, supra. See also
Richardson v. Johnsen, 41 Wis. 100 (1876); Hanson v. Gunderson, 95 Wis.
613, 70 N.W. 827 (1897); Saveland v. Western Wisconsin R. Co., 118 Wis.
267, 95 N.W. 130 (1903) ; Schaap v. Wolf, 173 Wis. 351, 181 N.W. 214 (1921) ;
Gether v. R. Connor Co., 196 Wis. 25, 219 N.W. 373 (1928); Yasaki, Oral
Alteration of a Written Contract: Expiration, Modification or New Substituted Contract, 33 Cal. L. Rev. 158 (1956) ; Annot., Effect of the Statute
of Frauds Upon the Right to Modify, By Subsequent Parole Agreement,
a Written Contract Required by the Statute to Be in Writing, 17 A.L.R.
10; 2 CORBIN, CONTRACTS, §306-7; 2 WILLISTON, CoNTaAcrs, §593-4.
53 Day v. Kerley, and Probst v. Di Giovanni, supra, note 1, are illustrative. It
is a bit difficult to conceive wherein the seller's change of position to justify
estoppel enters these cases; but, if the problem is regarded simply as a
question of fact respecting purchaser's good faith attempt to procure "suitable" financing, the evidence could well be held competent, bearing in mind
the purchaser's right to waive.
52
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more? If he accepts, he waives strict compliance with the contract
specifications. If he hesitates--does neither-he simply prolongs his
contractual status. If he demands return of his down payment, his
action will ordinarily be deemed premature, and a breach of contract.
"In any event, the contingency is self-executing." 54
In so describing the plight of the buyer, it is not intended to suggest that his motives in insisting upon the letter of the contract may
not often be an unvarnished attempt to escape his agreement. 55 It may
be conceded that a buyer who thus indulges in petty flyspecking is not
ultimately interested in either the money or the principle: he has simply
undergone a change of mind or of circumstance respecting the purchase, for which the seller is usually in no way at fault. If the subjective psychological sources of the phenomenon be of interest, they
probably could be found to exist in various degrees in high-pressure
brokerage practices, over-hasty inspections prior to purchase, the
"camel's back" syndrome which accompanies the pre-closing arrangements, and a generous sampling of woman's traditional prerogative.
Not the least of the circumstances tending to induce buyer-defection, however, is the waiting uncertainty of the matter. "We have
bought a house and we haven't, and perhaps we will be moving soon."
This plaint, all too true of the buyer whose transaction is "subject to
financing", can be borne by different people for different periods of
time, not always corresponding to the "reasonable time" within which
contracts are legally performable. Patience is a virtue not always enforceable by contract, as experience with the marriage contract amply
proves.
All of this may seem utterly aside from the question under discussion, but its connection can now be made clear. If the law is to test
contingencies of this nature not by whether or not they occurred
This statement, with which the opinion in Kovarik closed, would imply simply
that buyer will generally have no choice but to accept a suggestion of the
supposed sort. But the rule itself oversimplifies the practcal situation because
its application ordinarily involves questions of timing of the suggestion, its
basic informality and dubous enforceability, and its frequently tentative nature. Essentially, this situation is a simple variant of Kovarik v. Vesley; but
it is also a variant of Savich v. Ruiz, supra, note 1, which resulted oppositely.
55 See cases cited at note 9, supra. What is the relevancy and competency of
motive-evidence on this question? Since the ultimate issue of fact is good
faith, there is probably a justifiable inference that strong motive to escape the
contract would affect the purchaser's diligence in seeking to arrange acceptable financing. But is a purchaser's rejection of offered financing which varies
from the contract specification a "bad faith" rejection simply because he has
an independent motive for withdrawing from the contract, as was seemingly
determined in Fry v. George Elkins Co., supra, note 5? Or should the court
delve into the question whether the withdrawal from the contract was justified by the motivation-circumstance itself, as seemed to pervade Brandes v.
Oram Const. Co., supra, note 9? If, in Fry, purchaser's employer had ordered
him to Hawaii, would he have been in bad faith in advising his prospective
lender to this effect, knowing that such information would probably defeat
the loan?
54
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according to their terms, but rather by whether or not they were
"material" or "essential", the law will thereby simply heighten the
essential uncertainty and doubt which is the central vice of these contracts. If the contracting parties contemplated anything when they
entered upon their agreement, they contemplated that the agreement
would be executed by conveyance and transfer of possession as promptly as possible, or else would be effectively terminated so that each
could enter the market elsewhere. Time, which has so unthinkingly
been declared to be not of the essence of these transactions, G is often
the greatest single factor in the minds of the parties. The delays consequent upon the law's vacillating determination of uncertain materialities and essences murder the very essence of the transaction.
B. The Burden of Proof
A procedural aspect of the "subject to financing" condition which
appears to have received little specific attention in the cases is that in
respect to the burden of proof. On which party does it lie, the party
seeking to enforce the main contract, or the party seeking to avoid the
same on the ground that the condition has not occurred? In short, is
unavailability of financing a matter of affirmative defense, which the
purchaser (ordinarily) must prove?
the question of good faith. The objective condition itself ordinarily
relates to the "ability" of the buyer-borrower to procure the indicated
financing. Either expressly or by implication, as heretofore pointed
out, 57 the buyer undertakes to seek such financing "in good faith," or

"with due diligence," or "by reasonable efforts." The extent of effort,
in terms of numbers of applications, duration of search, etc., which
this undertaking calls for could conceivably extend from none whatsoever all the way up to an exhaustive search extending over a span of
years. The question whether the requirement of "good faith" was or
was not met under given circumstances most frequently becomes the
focal point of the entire litigation ;58 but a point frequently ignored is
that the de facto availability of the financing itself is a critical factor in
determining the ultimate question-is a factor, indeed, without which
the buyer's total absence of diligent search may easily pale into insignificance. For who would contend that a purchase which no reasonable
lender would finance, and which was expressly made contingent upon
obtaining financing, was enforceable simply because the purchaser was
insufficiently energetic in collecting refusals?
Quite obviously, in all cases in which financing was not, in fact,
procured, it will involve no little difficulty to prove that it was nevertheless procurable. This is true because of the essentially personal
56 Long Inv. Co. v. O'Donnel, note 19, supra.

57 Notes 36 and 51, supra.
58 Ibid. Strangely, however, Kovarik includes no direct mention on the issue.
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nature of the transaction. A mortgage loan which would be approved
for one applicant might very well be disapproved for another, or approved under more stringent terms; and this despite the identity of the
offered security in the two cases. Commercial lenders most commonly
submit such applications to a board for approval, and deny to any
single individual the power to grant or refuse such an application. This
officer or that may be in a position, in certain cases, to give an opinion
as to the probable action of his board upon a given application ;59 but,
without such action having been taken in fact, the opinion will usually
require careful qualification in the hypothesis upon which it is based.
If, as seems sometimes to have been done,60 the purchaser is saddled with the burden of proving unavailability of financing after diligent application therefor, in order to avoid the contract, his proofs can
scarcely extend beyond the point of showing as many applications and
refusals as possible. The proof of the objective "unavailability" is
proof of a universal negative.
But if, on the other hand, the seller seeking to enforce the contract
is required to prove that available financing was lost due to purchaser's
lack of good faith application, the picture acquires a decidedly different
hue. The issue now has two facets: 1) Was the type of financing intended by the contingency available upon this purchaser's application,
and 2) Was its nonprocurement due to purchaser's failure to exercise
good faith efforts to procure it? Regardless of the extent to which
proof of the first proposition may tend to prove the second, it must be
abundantly clear that proof of the second cannot even anticipate the
first, to say nothing of establishing it.
Buyer's lack of diligence, in other words, concludes the issue
against him if he has the burden of proof ; but does not begin to resolve
the issue if seller has that burden.
The near-unanimous consensus of judicial opinion is that the financing contingency in these contracts constitutes a condition precedent
(or "suspensive" condition). 6 1 There seems to be a similar uniformity
5 Such testimony was received, and appeared to bear heavily on the result, in
Fry v. George Elkins Co., supra, note 5. Testimony of the same sort, suggesting that a loan either would or would not have been approved, was evidently
present in a number of the other cited cases, but is not directly adverted to.
Its competence has not, apparently, been called directly into question.
GODay v. Kerley, supra, note 1; Fry v. George Elkins Co., supra, note 5, where
buyer showed that applications to two banks where he was known were refused; Hannah v. Yanke, supra,note 6, where it appeared that a formal application to a building and loan and an informal inquiry at a bank were both
refused; Schwartz v. Baker, supra, note 4, where purchaser limited his inquiry to FHA-insured loans.
61 Cases directly so holding include substantially all of those cited in notes 1-10,
excepting the distinguished cases at notes 6 and 10. See also, RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS, §250 and 259, making it appear that, if the "subject to financing" clause does not create a condition precedent, it creates an "exception"
(if subsequent in form), and has the same general effect. See also 3
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §666-674.
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in the authoritative position that the party who relies upon a contract
as the basis of his action or defense has the burden of establishing the
fulfillment of conditions precedent expressed therein.6- Some authorities, recognizing the occasional difficulties of proof which result from
this rule, resolve the issue on the basis of comparative availability of
proof, each party being required to prove that fact which is most obviously within his competence. 63 But if the ultimate fact be availability
of financing, the buyer, with his peculiar knowledge of his own finances, would hardly seem in a better position to prove the ultimate fact
than would be the seller, with his peculiar knowledge of the property
proposed as security. Neither would have a demonstrable advantage
over the other respecting the "tightness" or "looseness" of the money
market, nor respecting the current practices or policies of lending institions. So that the "peculiar knowledge" test, even assuming it to be
applicable to contract disputes, would seem to afford little assistance.
The conclusion is that the party relying upon the contract for his
cause of action-ordinarily the seller under the interim contract here
involved-should be required to prove the buyer's ability to procure the
financing involved, and that the failure to obtain it was, in fact, due to
buyer's failure to put forth a good faith attempt.
C. Kinds of Evidence; Judicial Notice
As above suggested, the proof of availability of financing will in
most instances have to be hypothetical. To the question, "Had this
buyer applied to you for sufficient financing to enable him to complete
this purchase, would you have made the loan ?", the obvious answer is
a highly-indefinite "Depends". Any attempt to correlate in a proper
hypothetical question all of the myriad factors upon which the answer
will depend is ordinarily foredoomed to failure. This is true, of course,
only in those cases in which no prospective lender actually did issue a
loan commitment, conforming to the terms of the financing contingency,
and continue it in force.
Alternatives of dubious validity have been employed. One is to
attempt escape from the burden of proving that financing was in fact
62

63

The evidentiary corrollary of the determination that the condition is precedent
has seldom been discussed directly in "subject to financing" cases. Of Wigmore's three rules, 9 WIGmoRE, EViDENCE, §2486, he indicates that the
affirmative allegation rule applies most peculiarly to the case of "a promise
alledging non-performance of a contract" (p. 274) Corbin would distinguish
the burden of allegation from the burden of proof in "exception" cases,

"forcing (defendant) to raise the specific issue on which he chooses to defend
...but... it would seem to be sound policy to make the plaintiff prove his
case by a preponderance of the evidence." 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS, §751, p.
902. See also ibid., §749, p. 895, RESTATEMENT, CONTRAc's, §91 and Williston's comment thereon at 1 WLLISTON, CONTRACrS, §179 would seem unambiguous.
Such is Wigmore's third rule, referred to at note 62. Discussions of it appear
at 5 Cornell L. Q. 199 and in Laughlin, Location of the Burden of Persua-

sion, 18 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 3 (1956).
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available by proving instead that buyer made no attempt to procure it.
This device has been sufficiently analyzed above. Granted that, if the
failure to seek financing caused the contract to fail, buyer cannot plead
his own wrong in defense; the question remains whether in fact, the
stipulated financing was available.
A device sometimes used to satisfy this nagging issue is proof of
the common practice of lending institutions in the community with
respect to mortgage loans, as going to both the question of the proper
construction of the indefinite "subject to financing" clause and to the
question of the availability of financing. The "going rate" of interest,
the "accepted charges" for mortgage financing, the "standard provisions" of the repayment contract and of the security documents, the
"minimum standards" of borrower-acceptability are all terms which are
introduced into the controversy. The obvious fact, however, is that in
the ordinary case the parties cannot be shown to have contracted with
reference to these terms; and that they are consequently (in the absence
of judicial fiat) totally irrelevant. The exceptional case is that in which
the contract specifies that the intended financing shall qualify for FHA
or VA loan repayment guaranty. The various details of such financing
are spelled out in the regulations issued by the respective agencies; and,
although such regulations establish only partial limitations, they afford
a fair and reasonable basis for determining the parties' intention in
making their contract "subject to FHA (or VA) financing." The same
regulations and practices of the agencies would seem competent to
prove, in cases where the lending institution had approved the loan subject to FHA or VA commitment but buyer had failed to apply for such
commitment, that the guaranty would (or would not) have been obtained if applied for.
Because, however, the practices of lenders and lending institutions
lack the high degree of uniformity which characterize those of the governmental agencies under their published regulations,6 4 the former
evidence would seem subject to the objection of irrelevancy.
Perhaps the most high-handed device employed in determining the
disputed details of financing and its availability is to take judicial
notice of the "common practices" of the community in mortgage financing.6 5 The problem is not so much the very serious one of whether the
64 The author is not so naive as to assume in any total sense what is probably
an irresistable assumption in a court: that the regulations are written and
applied without ambiguity or inconsistency, or that the overall operations of
the agencies are any less vacillating than are those of private lenders. But
the obvious objective factors (loan amounts, interest rates, charges, loan durations, etc.) are rather definitely prescribed in the government regulations, and
are matters of public record in this sense. Government administrators are
without power to change or depart from these standards directly.
65 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, §245-248 define the legal effect of usage in interpreting contracts. §247: "A usage is operative upon parties to a transaction
where and only where
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mortgage financing practices of the area are, in fact, matters of common knowledge. More emphatically, it is that "common practices" are
neither uniform nor invariable as applied to individual cases. The
assumption, therefore, that the contingency under consideration was
fulfilled because, in the "common" or "average" case the loan would
have been granted on certain terms, is simply assumptio non probata.
Were the contingency properly susceptible of such interpretation, there
would seem to be little point in requiring the buyer to make diligent
application for a loan, or in requiring seller to prove fulfillment of the
contingency. It would be truly "self executing."
The conclusion is that, in cases in which a loan application was not
actually approved in terms conformable to the contract-and, excepting
possibly VA and FHA financing, an attempted proof of the condition's fulfillment, without opinion evidence, is probably insufficientthough many of the decisions blandly overlook the point.
IV. PROBLEMIS OF APPROPRuATE REMEDY

The law authorizes four basic forms of remedy to parties claiming
under land contracts, interim or installment. These are:
(1) The remedies by which the contract is avoided or annulled
retroactively, and the parties restored to original positions, as by true
rescission."0

66

(a) they manifest to each other an assent that the usage shall be operative,.or
(b) either party intends the effect of the words or other acts to be governed
by the usage, and the other party knows or has reason to know this intention, or
(c) the usage exists in such transactions and each party knows of the usage
or it is generally known by persons under similar circuxmstances, unless
either party knows or has reason to know that the other party has an
intention inconsistent with the usage."
Wigmore is to the same effect: There must be either actual knowledge of the
usage, or the usage must be so broad that knowledge can be inferred. When
inferred, the method of interpretation becomes a question of probabilities of
meaning in each case. 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE, §2464. 3 WILLIsToN, CoNTRACTs,
§658, distinguishes usage from custom (customary law) and points out
that, unlike custom, "Usage ... need not be 'reasonable', but the more unreasonable it is, the more evidence will be required to establish actual knowledge
or duty to know the usage." Hewitt v. John Week L. Co., 77 Wis. 548, 46
N.W. 822 (1890) and Shores Lumber Co. v. Stitt, 102 Wis. 450, 78 N.W.
563 (1899) discuss the requirement of actual or constructive knowledge of
usage, the latter distinguishing cases where the usage is offered in an attempt
to annex an incident not expressed in the contract from those where it is
simply offered to explain a doubtful provision of the contract itself. None
of the cited authorities appear to suggest that evidence of usage would be
competent to prove, in our context, that purchaser's attempt to procure financifig would have succeeded had it been more diligently pursued. This
seems to represent a substitution of judicial notice of usage, for a critical
element of special proof, without, ordinarily, the slightest evidence that the
parties either knew or took into account the alleged "common lending practices" when they made their contract "subject to financing."
Accurately, "rescission" is not a legal remedy at all, in the sense that a court
may grant it. It is, properly speaking, a mutual compact of the parties terminating their preexisting contractual obligations to one another. Such compact
may exist irrespective of prior breach, and will normally include an adjust-
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(2) The remedies by which the contractual status of the parties is
terminated, and obligations of further performance discharged, without
restoring the parties to their original positions, as by strict foreclosure,
67
action to quiet title, or ejectment.
(3) The remedies by which the nonperforming party is required to
perform specifically or to pay damages as substituted performance.6 8
(4) The remedies by which a deposit is declared forfeited, pursuant
to a stipulation of liquidated damage.6"
The last is, of course, but a variant of the ordinary damage action;
but it is separately classified here because of its high incidence in
interim-contract cases.
When a purchaser fails or refuses to complete his purchase, and
ment of whatever part performances have occurred. A plea of fatal indefiniteness of contract, of illegality, of incapacity, or of the statute of frauds,
if successful, effects a parallel type of avoidance. The "right of rescission"
which flows from breach of contract is quite different. It terminates the
obligation to perform further, if the nondefraulter so elects to treat the
breach. Woodman v. Blue Grass L. Co., 125 Wis. 489, 103 N.W. 236 (1905);
Shenners v. Pritchard, 104 Wis. 287, 80 N.W. 458 (1899) ; Pierson v. Dorff,
198 Wis. 43, 223 N.W. 579 (1929); Dooley v. Stillson, 40 R.I. 332, 128 Atl.
217, 52 A.L.R. 1505 (1925).
67 Sometimes designated "disaffirming" remedies. Pierson v. Dorff, supra, note
66, is qualified by Schwartz v. Syver, 264 Wis. 526, 59 N.W. 2d 489 (1952),
but on another point: the availability of restitution in the face of disaffirmance. Chartier v. Simon, 250 Wis. 639, 27 N.W. 2d 751 (1947) seems to
approve the ejectment remedy, since legal title remains in vendor. See

Lathrop, Tire Land Contract Vendee Has Come of Age, 32 Wis. Bar Bull.

50 (August, 1959). Mr. Lathrop's reference is exclusively to the "installment" contract, however, and his reasoning may be inapplicable to interim
arrangements, in which right to possession does not ordinarily pass. The
continued distinction in terms of legal effect, between deeds with mortgagesback and installment contracts as methods of vendor-financing is, as Mr.
Lathrop suggests, difficult to justify.
6s The specific performance remedy, as applied to sellers, was approved in Heins
v. Thompson & Flieth L. Co., 165 Wis. 563, 163 N.W. 173 (1917), as a matter
of right under what seem to be ordinary circumstances, and not as a matter
of discretion. No detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of the rule
there announced has appeared in Wisconsin cases since, the right of vendor
to such remedy having apparently been taken for granted. Cf. Walter v.
Hoffman, 267 N.Y. 365, 196 N.E. 291, 101 A.L.R. 919 (1935), suggesting that
the question is less one of blind "mutuality of remedy" than one of adequacy

of remedy at law.

RESTATEMENT,

CONTRACTs,

§372-3 are vague on the point

taken together. Interesting discussions of the doctrine are Thomas, The
Inequity of Mutuality of Remedy, 2 Baylor L. Rev. 54 (1949) and Dozier, "The
California Doctrine of Mutuality in Suits for Specific Performance," 28 Cal.
L. Rev. 492 (1940). The latter suggests that the question whether the positive
applications of the doctrine are proper is unimportant, in view of the vendor's
right to proceed on the debt (note) at law, and foreclose his vendor's lien.
Presumably the remedy at law in Wisconsin is similarly unrestricted to damages. 1st Nat'l Bank of Sparta v. Agnew, 45 Wis. 131 (1878) ; Oconto County
v. Bacon, 181 Wis. 538, 195 N.W. 412 (1923).
69 After Long Inv. Co. v. O'Donnel, supra, note 19, it would appear that provisions for optional liquidation of damages in the customary form are not
operative simply by silence, since there is no "essential" time at which the
provision is operative, absent an express or implied notice to buyer of seller's
election to exercise his rights under the clause. The unusual circumstance of
the case, the liquidated amount being less than the "earnest money" in seller's
hands, may serve as a ground of distinction in future litigation, however .
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when a negotiated settlement of the contract fails of accomplishment,
the purchaser's only immediate concern is recovery of his down payment money, ordinarily held in escrow by the broker. He supposes that
such recovery is all that stands between him and his final escape from
the transaction.
Against this fund, however, two claims clamor for payment: the
broker's claim for commission and the seller's claim for damages. If
the financing contingency of the contract does not, by reason of indefiniteness of statement, itself avoid the agreement, its nonfulfillment will
produce that effect; and the seller's claim certainly, the broker's probably, will be avoided.
If, on the other hand, the contingency has been "essentially" or
"substantially" fulfilled, or if it has been waived, or if buyer is estopped
to show its nonfulfillment, then the buyer's claim against the fund is
reduced to the rather dubious status of an unjust enrichment claim
against the seller;?O and seller and broker distribute the fund between
themselves as per their contract, broker first, seller second.
The buyer's assumption, however, that his possible loss is confined
to the escrow deposit is false; and one of which his attorney should
promptly disabuse him. Failing to escape the contract under the financing contingency, buyer may be subject to substantial damages in
addition to loss of this deposit.
In consequence, there is added to the buyer's legal uncertainty
respecting the recoverability of his deposit a further uncertainty
respecting his additional liability. Should he be proceeded against in
law, for ordinary contract damages, he faces the prospect of paying a
judgment based on the formula: contract price minus fair market value
of property at time of breach minus deposit.71 In circumstances in
which the value of the property is fairly stable, and in which the property was not too badly overpriced, this formula will yield no net recovery to the seller. The significant circumstance which bears heavily
on the advisability of this remedy in "subject to financing" cases is
that, to establish availability of the financing, the seller must establish
an adequate security-value in the property itself. This process will
tend to defeat the seller's attempt to establish a low market value under the formula.
But the acute lawyer, representing the seller in such situations, will
70 Schwartz v. Syver, supra, note 67. The authorities cited in support of the

doctrine suggest a limitation of its availability which would seem even more
insurmountable in most cases than the difficult burden of proof which the
case places upon the buyer: the fact that the relief is not decreed against a
seller in position to specifically perform. Unless vendor has resold the premises, therefore, buyer's right to restitution seems tenuous. See, esp. Corbin,
The Right of a Defaulting Vendee to the Restitution of Installents Paid,
40 Yale L.J. 1013 (1931).
7'Pierson v. Dorff, supra, note 66.
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elect a different remedy: that of specific performance. The sole drawback of this course, assuming a financially responsible buyer, is that the
resale of the property is necessarily postponed pendente lite. That
problem, however, may be present regardless of the form of action
selected, assuming inability to negotiate settlement of the dispute, so
that it constitutes no insuperable objection.
The most important practical advantage gained by proceeding in
specific performance is that it enables seller to separate his proofs on
the question of security-value from those on the question of fair market value, and effectively shifts the burden on the latter question. In
addition, seller places himself in a position to recover the "demurrage"
on the property (taxes, interest, insurance upkeep, heating, repairs
etc.) over and above the basic contract debt.
The procedure is this: Seller commences suit praying that buyer be
required specifically to perform by paying the balance of purchase
price, plus demurrage, and alleging that, upon such payment, seller will
himself perform by conveyance. Buyer's most usual answering plea
sets up the contingency. This plea failing, judgment is entered for the
full balance due on the contract, ordering payment within a reasonable
period, and directing that, unless such amount is paid as ordered, the
subject property (treated as equitably belonging to the buyer) be advertised and sold at equitable foreclosure sale to meet the judgment.7 2
To this point, the only question which has arisen respecting the value
of the property is that respecting its security value, in connection with
the availability of financing, and the seller's position is that such value
was-at time of breach-adequate.
Subsequently, the foreclosure auction is held. Prominent among
the bidders, and going as high as he must, is the seller-plaintiff. Following the auction, the matter comes back into court for confirmation
-and determination of deficiency. 73 If defendant-buyer intends now
to defeat or lessen the impending deficiency, he has the burden of
showing that the auction did not realize fair market value, against the
presumption that it did.7 4 The inquiry now is not concerned with fair
market at time of breach, but with fair market at time of sale; and
opinion evidence offered on behalf of buyer is ranked against the fact
of the open public auction sale.
The court's alternatives, even assuming its dissatisfaction with the
72Heins v. Thompson & Flieth L. Co., supra, note 68. The procedure should be
carefully distinguished from that followed in mortgage foreclosures, under
Ch 278, Wis. Stats. The provisions of Ch. 281, Wis. Stats., governing the
procedure, are sketchy at best; and the matter is largely governed by judicial
custom.
7 Heins v. Thompson & Flieth L. Co., supra, note 68. "... in practice, payment
of the purchase money is, probably, generally enforced by the sale of the land
to satisfy the amount due for purchase money and costs, and a judgment for
the deficiency, if any, enforceable by execution." p. 572.
7 Griswold v. Barden, 146 Wis. 35, 130 N.W. 952 (1911).
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bid, are limited: it may present plaintiff-seller with an option to reduce
or waive his deficiency or submit to a resale; it may order resale, including an upset price; or it may simply order a resale.7 Meanwhile,
the costs and demurrages continue to run against the buyer's account.
Ultimately, he must either purchase or go bankrupt. If the necessary
financing is in fact unavailable (regardless of the legal finding on the
point), the buyer's only course is bankruptcy. The credit purchase
which buyer originally contracted to make has been converted into a
present cash liability.
The sceptre of this outcome will discipline many purchasers to hazard either the action or the appeal undertaken by the buyer in Kovarik
v. Vesely. The risk of loss is entirely disproportionate to the possibility
of gain by recovery of the deposit money. The innocent-appearing and
obscure words, "subject to financing", have evolved into a monster.
Whatever may be said for or against the construction which the
courts have placed upon the clause itself, it would seem that the practice of granting specific performance on seller's plea in such cases is
inequitable and unwarranted.70 No rule is better supported by authority
than is the rule that equity will not enforce a contract which is doubtful and unclear in its terms. In the sense of this rule, a degree of
clarity substantially in excess of that required for legal enforceability
has been consistently required.

77

It can scarcely be gainsaid that "subject to financing" contracts are
tentative and unsettled in their inception. By definition, they are contingent; and in the vast majority of cases, the precise meaning of the
contingency is lost in a cloud of doubts. Only in clear cases can the
finding that the contingency was satisfied so far as "material" be made
without substantial doubt, regardless of whether or not it is "against
the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.

'7 8

To per-

mit the invocation by seller of the equitable powers of the court against
this background seems improper.
More especially is this true when we consider that the contract
which is specifically enforced under the decree is essentially unlike the
one which the parties originally entered into. Buyer and seller both
envisioned the necessity of third-party financing as the sine qua non of
the transaction. It is inconceivable that buyer would have entered into
the transaction at all had it been put to him as a cash proposition, with
7 The rule is set forth in Suring State Bank v .Giese, 210 Wis. 489, 246 N.W.
556 (1933) with respect to mortgage foreclosures. Presumably, the same
basic equitable considerations apply to the land contract suit.
76 Note 68, supra.
S7Schmeling v. Kriesel, 45 Wis. 325 (1878) ; Park v. M., St. P. & S.S.M. R. Co.,
114 Wis. 347, 89 N.W. 532 (1902); RESTATEmENT, CoNTRAcTs, §370; 5 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS, §1424, p. 3986.
78 The latter standard was employed in Kovarik v. Vesely, supra, note 27, in
affirming trial court's finding respecting "immateriality" of the loan-source
provisions, in support of specific performance at seller's behest.
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the money to come from his own assets. Even assuming that the buyer's failure to procure the financing and to complete the purchase was
entirely deliberate, the hard fact of the matter is that equity cannot,
after the event, restore the availability of such financing so that the
purchase may proceed essentially as per contract.79 Its decree of specific performance, under such circumstances, amounts realistically to a
hollow gesture, stripping the contract of its most vital provision.
The only apparent reason advanced for allowing the remedy to the
seller is because, had seller defaulted, the same remedy would have
been available to the buyer.8 0 This reasoning constitutes an affirmative
application of the doctrine of mutuality of remedy-a doctrine which
has never possessed any but the haziest logical support, and one which.
at least in its affirmative applications, has been thoroughly discredited.sI
In plain fact, the seller's action for specific performance is nothing but
a debt-collection device; and no reason has ever been suggested why
the legal remedy is inadequate for those purposes."2 Indeed, once the
specific performance decree has worked its tactical magic by dispensing
the seller from proving his legal damage, all aspects of its equitable
nature disappear, and the debt collection proceeds by ordinary legal
processes.83
Pursuing the mutuality concept a bit further, however, we find a
common practice of attempting to block, by contract, even the buyer's
well-established right of specific performance upon seller's attempted
default. By insertion of the customary avoidance clause, the standard
interim contract provides that should seller fail to make title as he
undertakes to do, and buyer is unwilling to waive the default, the agree"The court took the position that courts of equity endeavor to enforce specific
performance of agreements for sale of land, and therefore was justified in
changing the agreement to make the same possible to perform .... We are
of the opinion that the court went beyond sound discretion in its decree in
this case," Degheri v. Carobine, 102 N.J. Eq. 264, 140 Atl. 406 (1928).
SONote 68, supra.
81 Ibid. The logical separation of affirmative and negative applications of the
doctrine requires a feat of mental gymnastics, but is most easily understood
as a technique for avoiding the usual requirements for invocation of equity.
If a petitioner for specific performance can show no grounds for equitable
relief on his own account, he pleads the rule. Likewise, if one resisting the
petition cannot disprove petitioner's grounds for equitable relief, he invokes
the negative rule. Since a seller, unable by reasonable measures to remove
clouds, incumbrances, or other title defects, may resist specific performance
(see "Specific Performance of Land Contract Where Vendor Will Be Compelled to Acquire, or Incur Expense in Clearing Title," 171 A.L.R. 1299),
should not the negative application of the rule deny the relief on seller's
petition? The rule itself prompts the dog to chase its tail.
s-Quite the contrary. The most telling argument in favor of granting specific
performance to the seller is that it is the practical equivalent of the legal
remedy. See Dozier, supra,note 68.
83 "Otherwise . . .such enforcement (contempt) might be contrary to the policy
of our system." Heins v. Thompson & Flieth L. Co., supra, note 68, p. 572.
The reference is clearly to the constitutional imprisonment for debt prohibition.
79
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ment shall be null and void.8 4 Not even a damage action is allowed
buyer, to say nothing of specific performance.8 5 Under this common
form of contract, therefore, not even the mutuality doctrine seems
applicable to permit seller's action.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The real estate purchase or sale is, in many or most cases, the
largest single purchase or sale upon which the average man enters in
his lifetime, and most commonly involves the longest-term liability and
planning. He will deliberate at length and consult technical or professional advisers before purchasing an automobile or signing a will; he
will often see his attorney before accepting a simple warranty deed,
preparation of which is hardly more than ministerial.8 6 But he will
enter upon the real estate transaction with no greater attention to the
details of the matter than a commission-seeking broker happens to
afford.
Practical considerations, aside from an unseemly anxiety to fast-sell
the property, may arguably require that some form of tentative agreement bridge the time interval between initial decision and procurement
of financing. The property can scarcely remain on the market, unless
the ordinary merchantile principle of "first come, first served" is to be
followed (and in most cases, there appears little real reason why it
should not be). s 7 But, of all the conceivable devices for bridging this
interval, from gentlemen's agreement on up, the "subject to financing"
clause as commonly used, vague as to detail, indefinite in duration,
The clause has been variously interpreted. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Chauncey,
214 Mass. 271, 101 N.E. 423 (1913) held: "This clause means that if it turns
out that without fault on the part of the defendants subsequent to the execution of the contract they have a defective title, then, after refunding payments
made, all obligations of both parties shall cease." However, "the tenor of the
contract does not require the extinguishment of outstanding defects." Cf.
cases cited in annotation, supra, note 81; Douglas v. Ransom, 198 Wis. 445,
224 N.W. 473 (1929). See also Moskow v. Burke, 255 Mass. 563 (1926);
N.Y. N.H. & H. R. Co. v. Butter, 276 Mass. 236, 176 N.E. 797 (1931). If
vendor does not covenant his title, what does he covenant?
85 Ibid.
86 The emphatic insistence by many Unauthorized Practice committees that
drafting a deed constitutes practice of law, while apparently conceding that
drafting a contract for deed does not, seems a bit absurd.
87 A procedure pregnant with interesting possibilities is that lately adopted by a
large Wisconsin brokerage in cases where the interim contract is subject to
resale of purchaser's residence. The agreements provide that seller will continue to hold his property on the market, and that, on receipt by seller and
notice to buyer of a subsequent offer, buyer will have 48 hours within which
to waive the condition or lose his right to purchase. The clause is, to date,
untested in court. The only difficulties which it may engender are 1) a
reluctance of the broker to exert agressive effort toward finding a second
purchaser of the same premises, placing the broker in an embarrassing conflict of interests and 2) a reluctance of subsequent purchasers to risk the
unassailability of the forfeiture aspects of the clause. Where the first purchaser can be induced to quitclaim, the latter problem is solved. The adaptability of the device to the financing contingency offers an interesting speculation.
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literally if not legally incomprehensible as to meaning, and often vicious as to consequences both to buyer and seller, is probably the worst.
Regarding the matter simply from the standpoint of the seller's
advantage, if he is to remove his property from the market and hold it
for possible purchase by the buyer, the option contract offers precision
of terms and of duration, and a consideration which can be enforced,
if the purchase is not concluded, without running afoul of the law of
forfeiture or involvements in vague principles of unjust enrichment.ss
From the purchaser's standpoint, the option creates an indisputable
first right to buy, limits potential loss to the amount paid for the option,
puts a specific time limit on the uncertainty of the transaction, and
avoids the potential dire consequences of risking all in an attempt to
prove nonfulfillment of a financing contingency, as his sole defense to a
specific performance action.
The argument is that buyers will refuse to pay for options, if not
solidly confident of their ability to finance; and that sellers will not
give options except for substantial consideration, without present assurance that buyers actually will buy. The reply is that sellers now
give for nothing what are effectively options, without assurance that
buyers actually will buy; and that buyers risk in deposits (and often
lose, by negotiation or by litigation) far more substantial sums than they
would be called upon to pay for equivalent options.8 9
Both parties, however, have a stake in the ultimate consideration:
the essential importance, both economically and psychologically, of
time. The pressure of weeks, months and years spent in uncertainty,
with the mounting expenses of idle property surcharged by legal and
court costs and charges, is a casualty against which a negotiated optionprice would be cheap insurance.
Minds may differ on the question whether a "subject to financing"
clause should be construed favorably to or against the validity of the
contract, whether burdens of proof should lie here or there ,and
whether this remedy or that is appropriately granted. So long as this
state of doubt and disagreement remains the legal atmosphere in which
these clauses must operate, it would seem to behoove brokers, attorneys
and parties to avoid such clauses as they would a plague. Legislation
to that end, reminiscent of the old "lightning rod" and "stallion" provisions of the negotiable instruments law, would not seem unwarranted.
Failing this, it would seem that judicial policy should be inclined
strongly to disfavor such contracts.
88 Corbin's article, cited supra, note 70, clearly contrasts the option in these

respects.
89 There appears to be no economic science by which the fair value of an option
can be appraised. Presumably, however, a relatively short-term option should
be procurable for substantially less than the 5-10% of purchase price now
customarily demanded as "earnest money." One per cent would be nearer the
mark, if a 30-day option were involved.

